Credibility of climate change denial in social media by Pin, Paolo & Samantray, Abhishek
ARTICLE
Credibility of climate change denial in social media
Abhishek Samantray 1* & Paolo Pin2,3
ABSTRACT Public perception about the reality of climate change has remained polarized
and propagation of fake information on social media can be a potential cause. Homophily in
communication, the tendency of people to communicate with others having similar beliefs, is
understood to lead to the formation of echo chambers which reinforce individual beliefs and
fuel further increase in polarization. Quite surprisingly, in an empirical analysis of the effect of
homophily in communication on the level of polarization using evidence from Twitter con-
versations on the climate change topic during 2007–2017, we ﬁnd that evolution of homo-
phily over time negatively affects the evolution of polarization in the long run. Among various
information about climate change to which people are exposed to, they are more likely to be
inﬂuenced by information that have higher credibility. Therefore, we study a model of
polarization of beliefs in social networks that accounts for credibility of propagating infor-
mation in addition to homophily in communication. We ﬁnd that polarization can not increase
with increase in homophily in communication unless information propagating fake beliefs has
minimal credibility. We therefore infer from the empirical results that anti-climate change
tweets are largely not credible.
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Introduction: polarization of beliefs, homophily in
communication, information credibility
P olarization of beliefs is about the existence of opposingbeliefs within large sections of the society (Bail et al., 2018;DiMaggio et al., 1996; Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008; Prior,
2013). In situations, like climate change action, where unanimous
belief can drive the required collective steps, polarization can be a
hurdle and may lead to socially undesired actions (Iyengar and
Westwood, 2015; Iyengar et al., 2012; McCright and Dunlap,
2010; Center, 2014). Public understanding of climate change has
remained polarized (Moore et al., 2019; McCright et al., 2014;
Hamilton, 2011). Polarization of beliefs can be affected not only
by the nature of users’ tendencies like homophily in commu-
nication about the reality of climate change, but also by certain
nature of the information itself. Credibility of information is one
of such properties of information. We discuss these determinants
of polarization below.
Homophily in communication can affect the polarization of
beliefs. Homophily in communication is a key tendency of users
in information propagation media like Twitter and other plat-
forms: people tend to communicate with others who hold similar
beliefs (Barberá, 2015; Conover et al., 2011). Although homophily
can facilitate the ﬂow of information (Jackson and López-Pintado,
2013), it can lead to polarization (Bessi et al., 2016) as well and
decrease the general ability of the society to learn the truth
(Taylor et al., 2018; Golub and Jackson, 2012). Communicating
only with people who share similar ideology or opinion restricts
beliefs and prevents learning the truth (Madsen et al., 2018;
Acemoglu et al., 2011, 2010). For example, homophily among
liberals and conservatives in political blogs links (Adamic and
Glance, 2005), i.e., the tendency of liberal and conservative blogs
to link primarily within their separate communities, leads to echo
chambers (Jasny et al., 2015; Garrett, 2009; Flaxman et al., 2016),
and hence beliefs can be polarized due to such exposure to
selective information (Bakshy et al., 2015). Similarly, homophily
in opinion exchanges in social media (e.g., via publicly visible
replies and mentions in Twitter) can reinforce beliefs within
various sections of the network due to selective exposure. Pre-
viously echo chambers have been observed for climate change
discussions on social media (Williams et al., 2015; McCright and
Dunlap, 2010). Such patterns when repeat themselves in various
parts of the network can lead to polarization of beliefs.
Credibility of information is also an important factor to create
polarization, especially in online media where usually there exists
information from several sources (Greer, 2003) that propagate
controversial beliefs. Credibility of information is the precision of
information, it signiﬁes how certain the information is and helps
to assign a certain level of trust to the information (Kiousis, 2001;
Hovland and Weiss, 1951). The credibility of information that
propagates in a social network is a critical factor that can shape
the beliefs: if incoming information from a person’s social net-
work carries no credibility, then it is less likely to be incorporated
in to the belief of the person (Pornpitakpan, 2004; Heesacker
et al., 1983). Hence, negative consequences that may arise due to
the spread of fake information in social networks depend on
information credibility, thereby making it a factor that can induce
polarization. The importance of precision of misinforming signals
has also been highlighted recently by Allcott and Gentzkow
(2017). Credibility is a dimension of information which is inde-
pendent of veracity of the information. For instance, a particular
(unintended) fake story can be more credible if the information
source is highly reputable (and hence the fake story inherits the
credibility of the source) compared to the case when the same
story comes from a less credible information source. It is the
former case that has the potential to change beliefs in the society
and change the existing levels of polarization concerning the truth
of its story. Credibility of information in social media, generally
speaking, may be ascribed due to several factors including repu-
tation of information source, number of veriﬁed facts cited along
with the information, mentioning opinion leaders and others
(Markham, 2006; Westerman et al., 2014). Lastly, credibility of a
communicated information is independent from the preciseness
with which the information source believes the information. For
example, a certain propaganda house which believes strongly
about a story need not be able to spread such beliefs in the society
through various communications because such communications
may lack the degree of credibility required to generate substantial
change in beliefs in society.
Twitter has become a modern platform for news dissemination
and opinion exchanges, and is widely adopted by many users
worldwide. We believe discussions and information propagation
that happens on such a platform has potential to shape beliefs at a
large scale. Important topics like climate change are also dis-
cussed on such social media platforms. With fake information on
many topics becoming prevalent on widely adopted social media
platform like Twitter, it is probably not surprising that there are
several tweets both in favor and against the statement that climate
change is a real concern. Fake information regarding such an
important issue as climate change can pose a collective hurdle for
the society at large if such information becomes highly credible
among users of the platform. In this study, we infer the credibility
of anti-climate change opinions on Twitter using (i) an empirical
analysis that investigates the effect of homophily in commu-
nication patterns on the polarization of beliefs, and (ii) the pre-
dictions of a model of polarization of beliefs that jointly accounts
for the roles of information credibility and homophily in com-
munication. For the empirical analysis, we use tweets about cli-
mate change topic during 2007–2017. We rely on opinion
exchanges among climate change believers and skeptics made via
mentioning (and replying) others in tweets as the communication
pattern. (Replies in Twitter tag the user names at the beginning of
tweets, while user mentions can be made anywhere within the
text of tweets). This is because retweets do not contain new
opinions and are mere repetitions or broadcast of opinions
expressed in original tweets, whereas mentions contain explicit
referencing of other users and hence convey exchange of opinions
targeted towards users being mentioned.
Methods
Data. We use tweets from the online social network site Twitter.
Tweets are the messages posted by users on the platform. Tweets
can contain hashtags, mentions to other users, external links in
addition to text. A tweet posted by a user can be retweeted,
replied and liked by other users. The tweets from 2007 to 2017
were collected based on a search ﬁlter that each tweet contains at
least one of the following words: ‘climate change’, ‘#clima-
techange’, ‘global warming’, ‘#globalwarming’. The search was
performed via Tweeter’s public advanced search page. This col-
lection of tweets does not violate any ethical standards and
consists of only publicly available data. The data is complete in
the sense that it contains all original tweets that fulﬁll the search
criteria. Retweets of original tweets are not included in the data.
Each tweet however contains the retweet statistic, i.e., how many
times it has been retweeted. There are a total of 14,353,859 unique
tweets (without counting retweets values) and 3,595,205 unique
users in the dataset.
Measuring sentiment and opinion. The sentiment of each tweet
is computed using VADER (Hutto and Gilbert, 2014) model
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which is designed to conduct sentiment classiﬁcation speciﬁcally
on short texts like tweets. For each tweet, a score is obtained on
the scale −1 (most negative) to +1 (most positive). A message
with a positive sentiment is usually in favor of the (intended)
object in the message. However, the same message may be
communicated in a way that contains negative sentiment.
Therefore sentiment and opinion contained in a message are two
different characteristics of the message. This distinction between
sentiment and stance has been clariﬁed by previous studies on
stance detection of tweets (Sobhani et al., 2016; Mohammad et al.,
2017). From various data used in these previous studies, we use a
subset that is used to annotate whether the tweet is in favor or
against the statement “climate change is a real concern”. This
subset contains manual annotation of whether a tweet is in favor
or against the statement. We use this data as the training data to
predict the opinion expressed in the texts of tweets in our sample.
The tweets were coded as numerical features using the TF-IDF
(term frequency-inverse document frequency) representation and
the prediction on the dataset for this study was done using the
support vector classiﬁer, which had the highest predictive power
among other classiﬁers (logistic regression, decision tree). Each
user’s tweets were ﬁrst classiﬁed into one of the following
categories: in favor of the statement, against the statement, no
opinion. (Hence, in the ﬁrst stage, opinion is assigned to each
tweet). Next, each user was classiﬁed into one of the above
categories based on the category that contains the maximum
number of tweets from the user. Since a user on Twitter usually
has a belief about climate change (in general), the classiﬁcation
algorithm has managed to predict each users’s tweet into a single
category only. Only 42 users were classiﬁed as having no opinion,
and were dropped from the dataset. Most users had tweets in one
category only: either in favor, or against the statement. This
validates the performance of the classiﬁer at the user level even if
the prediction accuracy (at the tweets level) is about 72%.
Measure of homophily. The notion of homophily in commu-
nication is the presence of higher interaction among people who
hold the same opinion about climate change. For instance, the
group of users who believe climate change is not real have a
homophily in communication pattern if such users communicate
more among themselves than with users who believe climate
change is real.
Communication between users can take the forms of retweet-
ing and mentioning (includes replying) on the Twitter platform.
Although retweeting, in general, suggests that users share the
same ideology, mentioning can occur between users with differing
ideologies (tweet wars). To what extent do mentioning patterns in
tweets reveal communication among users having similar
ideologies? Previous studies (Lietz et al., 2014; Aragón et al.,
2013) reveal that homophily of the aggregate network measured
using retweeting and mentioning tend to be same, although
mentioning is more volatile at the group (sub network with a
particular ideology) levels. Hence, based on such studies, we
assume that homophily in mentioning patterns reveals the
homophily in retweeting (and following) patterns, for which we
do not have the data. Communication therefore refers to users
interacting via mentioning each other in tweets.
To measure homophily in communication among users with
same belief or opinion regarding climate change, we follow the
measures used in previous empirical studies on homophily
(Currarini et al., 2009; Halberstam and Knight, 2016; Colleoni
et al., 2014). Let I be the total number of users in a given month
who either mentioned other users or received mentions from
other users’ tweets. We indicate belief of a user as b∈ {a, f}, where
a and f correspond to the cases where the user is against and in
favor, respectively, of the climate change statement. a and f
represent two types of belief b. Suppose Ib is the total number of
type b users, then wb ¼ IbI is the fraction of type b users. Let vib be
the number of type b users mentioned by user i. Then sb ¼
1
Ib
P
i2Ib vi;b is the average number of same type users mentioned
by type b users, and db ¼ 1Ib
P
i2Ib vi;b is the average number of
opposite type users mentioned by type b users. Using this,
homophily of the group of type b users is deﬁned as Hb ¼ sbsbþdb
and the homophily of the society is deﬁned as
H ¼
X
b2fa;f g
wbHb:
Measure of polarization. A tweet carries an opinion (whether in
favor or against climate change being real), denoted as op, with a
certain sentiment, denoted as s. (We encode op as 1 if the message
in the tweet is against the climate change statement and as −1 if
the message is in favor of climate change). Irrespective of the
opinion, the sentiment can be positive or negative depending on
the way the message is communicated. So we use an emotion-
adjusted measure of belief called EAB that combines these two
aspects: expressed opinion in the message, and emotional content
in the message. For a given tweet with attributes op and s, EAB is
deﬁned as op⋅|s|, the product of opinion and absolute value of
sentiment.
A large number of tweets have neutral or close to neutral
sentiment, thereby increasing the mass around 0 and decreasing
the intensity of bimodality in the distribution of EAB. (The
presence of high volume of neutral tweets is not uncommon, for
example see Kušen and Strembeck (Kušen and Strembeck, 2018).
In this sense, the polarization indicator used during the
mathematical analysis in opinion updating model (see Supple-
mentary Information) cannot be carried to the empirical setting
directly. We therefore need another measure of polarization that
is sensitive to the properties (e.g., kurtosis and skewness) of a
distribution and carries the intuition of bi-modality approach
(i.e., the statistic should be sensitive to the degree of bi-modality
of a distribution). To calculate the degree of polarization involved
in the EAB distribution, we use the measure of ideological
divergence provided by Lelkes (2016), which characterizes the
level of polarization based on bi-modality of the distribution by
being sensitive to kurtosis and skewness (Freeman and Dale,
2013; Pﬁster et al., 2013). Using this measure, the polarization of
EAB is deﬁned as
s2 þ 1
kþ 3 ðn1Þ2ðn2Þðn3Þ
;
where s and k are the skewness and excess kurtosis of the EAB
distribution, and n is the sample size. The values of 1 and 0
correspond to cases when the EAB distribution is perfectly
bimodal and perfectly unimodal, respectively. A value greater
than 0.56 is categorized as bimodal. Although this threshold may
not be reached precisely, approaching this value is considered
coming closer to polarization (Lelkes, 2016).
The measure of polarization above is calculated at the levels of
tweets and is a stricter measure than when calculated at the level
of users. This is because a user might be slightly heterogeneous in
his tweets but aggregating all tweets would reveal one exact
ideology. For example, when a climate change skeptic user writes
a tweet, it is most likely to be against the statement that climate
change is real. However a few tweets of his might fall in favor of
the statement. In this sense, polarization is easier to obtain at an
user level than at the content (tweets) level.
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It is easy to see that the polarization measure describes a
different phenomenon than the homophily measure. While
homophily measure is constructed using users involved in a
mention activity in a given month (micro level), polarization is
measured using all the EAB of all tweets in the month (macro
level). This is in line with Esteban and Ray (1994), according to
whom any reasonable measure of polarization must be global in
nature.
Results
Negative effect of homophily on polarization. The monthly
time series of polarization of beliefs and homophily in commu-
nication during 2007–2017 are shown in Fig. 1. (Measures of
homophily and polarization are described in Methods section). It
appears that the evolutions of the two curves are not independent,
and polarization tends to decrease at times when homophily
increases. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and Phillips-Ouliaris test
suggest that polarization and homophily are cointegrated, i.e.,
they are bound in a long term equilibrium relationship such that
they mean-revert whenever there are deviations away from the
equilibrium. (Supplementary Information contains statistical
details of tests of cointegration). Hence it becomes natural to
model polarization and homophily jointly in a vector error cor-
rection (VEC) model (Granger and Weiss, 1983; Engle and
Granger, 1987). VEC models are a special class of models derived
from vector autoregression (VAR) models with an additional
term, called error correction term, to account for the cointegra-
tion. VEC model allows to study the lagged effects of homophily
on polarization and also the lagged effects of polarization on
homophily. Supplementary Table 4 contains details of the para-
meter estimates of VEC model: the lagged homophily covariates
negatively affect polarization in the long term with high statistical
signiﬁcance and the lagged effects of polarization on homophily
are not signiﬁcant. These estimates however do not form a con-
clusion about the direction of causality between homophily and
polarization. For assessing causality, we perform Granger caus-
ality test (Granger, 1969) with modiﬁcations, as suggested by
Toda and Yamamoto (1995), to adapt to the non-stationary
nature of both time series; the results are shown in Table 1.
(Further statistical details regarding these tests are available in
Supplementary Information). The conclusion that emerges is that
only homophily Granger-causes polarization with a negative
effect, and the causality in the other direction is absent, i.e.,
polarization does not Granger cause homophily. This empirical
result that homophily negatively affects polarization is counter-
intuitive to the discussions made previously about the nature of
homophily and polarization.
Effect of homophily on polarization depends on information
credibility. We study a simple model of emergence of polariza-
tion in social networks that highlights the joint effect of credibility
of propagating information and homophily in communication of
information to affect polarization. We model polarization as bi-
modality of the population’s distribution of beliefs and it captures
the following basic features, as laid down by Esteban and Ray
(1994), which are necessary for a distribution to be considered
polarized: there must be a high degree of homogeneity within
each group (whose agents hold same belief), a high degree of
heterogeneity across groups, and a small number of signiﬁcantly
sized groups. If the groups are of insigniﬁcant size (e.g., isolated
individuals), they do not contribute to polarization. The beliefs
can be emotion-adjusted as well, as is done in the empirical
analysis (see Methods section), to include the emotional content
of the belief; this does not change the nature of predictions of
our model.
In our model, we consider a social network with each agent
receiving information about a topic (e.g., the reality of climate
change) from the same number, k, of speakers (for simplicity).
Speakers of an agent are other agents in the network from whom
he receives information. An unobserved fundamental θ, with
values in the real line, describes the accuracy of the beliefs: an
agent with a higher value is more distant from the truth. At a
given time t, we assume there are two types of agents—θl, θr—
informed and misinformed, and the social network has a
homophily coefﬁcient of hk with respect to this property: h
speakers of an agent of type θi, i∈ {l, r}, are of the same θi type.
We model the prior beliefs of informed (θl) and misinformed (θr)
agents as distributions of θ over the real line to allow for
heterogeneous prior beliefs at time t. We assume that the prior
beliefs of informed and misinformed agents derive from
distributions Nðθ0; δ1l Þ and Nðθ0 þ ξ; δ1r Þ, respectively, with
a strictly positive value for ξ, in order to ensure that the
misinformed type are, on average, farther away from truth
compared to the informed type. The belief of the entire
population of the social network at time t, a density-weighted
average of the above distributions, is considered to be polarized if
it has two modes (peaks in the distribution).
We assume each agent communicates a particular realization of
his belief using a message (e.g., via a tweet) during the period
between t and a future time t+ 1, and all agents update their
prior beliefs at t+ 1 after incorporating beliefs about the
fundamental expressed in their speakers’ messages. Mathemati-
cally, a message from a speaker is modeled as an independent
noisy signal about the speaker’s realized belief, with the degree of
the noise (or uncertainty) being conditional on the type of
speaker. Since credibility of a communicated message is the
precision of belief expressed in the message, in our model, true
and fake information about the reality, arising from informed and
misinformed speakers, respectively, propagate with different
credibilities in the social network. (We denote the credibilities
or precisions of true and fake information as βl and βr,
respectively). We assume that the messages from informed agents
carry a positive credibility. (In our context of the reality about
climate change, this is a reasonable assumption). It is noteworthy0.4
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Fig. 1 Polarization of beliefs, homophily in communication. The ﬁgure shows
monthly evolutions of polarization of beliefs about climate change (blue)
and homophily in communication patterns on Twitter (orange) during
2007–2017
Table 1 Granger-causality tests
Null hypothesis Test statistic
Homophily does not Granger-cause polarization 12.3***
Polarization does not Granger cause homophily 4.0
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Based on the test statistics, only the ﬁrst null hypothesis is
rejected
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to mention that for a speaker of a given type θi, i∈ {l, r}, βi is
conceptually different from δi: while δi characterizes the
probability with which a particular random realization will be
selected as the belief for the speaker, βi characterizes how
precisely the realized belief is communicated in a message. In a
Bayesian update of beliefs, how a communicated message affects
the beliefs of listeners of the message depends on the belief
expressed in the communicated message, the precision (or
credibility) of the message, prior beliefs held by individual
listeners and the precision of such prior beliefs of listeners.
We now present the ﬁndings of some analyses conducted using
the model discussed above. (Mathematical proofs of the results
presented below are available in Supplementary Information). We
ﬁnd that in a random communication network with agents being
sufﬁciently uncertain about the prior beliefs they hold, polariza-
tion can not arise at time t+ 1, after agents have incorporated
their speakers’ beliefs. This means that, irrespective of the
precisions with which true and fake information diffuse in the
social network, they do not play a role in the emergence of
polarization without the support of non-random topology of the
social network and agents’ prior beliefs. We also ﬁnd that if
marginal increase in homophily at time t does not increase the
probability of polarization at t+ 1, it can happen only in the case
when the fake signals that propagate in the social network do not
have a minimal level of credibility and carry zero precision. A
visual illustration of this result is shown in Fig. 2. We believe this
provides a potential reason for our previous observation that, in
the climate change discussions on Twitter, polarization of beliefs
does not increase when homophily in communication patterns
increases.
Discussion
The online social network Twitter has remained an important
media for rapid spread of opinions. We studied the opinions
expressed in Twitter during 2007–2017 regarding the reality of
climate change. Below, we brieﬂy discuss our main ﬁndings and
their limitations, and suggest directions for future research.
The analysis over a long time period provides insight about the
direction of potential causality between homophily and polar-
ization which would otherwise not have been possible in cross-
sectional observations. In social networks, polarization of beliefs
(existence of large groups of people with opposing beliefs) and
homophily in communication (communication among people
having same beliefs) tend to be highly correlated. One potential
mechanism for such a correlation is that increase in homophily
can reinforce individual beliefs leading to the creation of echo
chambers and hence increase polarization. Another mechanism
for such a correlation is that increase in polarization increases
segregation of a society into different beliefs thereby acting as a
natural source to increase the probability of like-minded com-
munication (homophily). In the case of Twittersphere of climate
change conversations, we performed Granger causality tests on
the evolutions of homophily and polarization, and found that
only homophily Granger-causes polarization and not vice-versa,
i.e., increasing polarization does not lead to increase in
Fig. 2 Belief updating model. The ﬁgure illustrates increase in polarization at time t+ 1 due to increase in homophily (based on beliefs, e.g., reality of climate
change) at time t. There is zero probability for such an increase if fake information that propagates in the social network has zero credibility
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0344-4 ARTICLE
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS |           (2019) 5:127 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0344-4 | www.nature.com/palcomms 5
like-minded communication. It is important to note that Granger
causation of homophily on polarization does not fully establish its
causality. Granger causality (as explained in Supplementary
Information) is a concept about precedence of the cause
(homophily) before the effect (polarization). It says that the
evolution of homophily signiﬁcantly helps to predict evolution of
polarization in future. Existence of Granger causality therefore
does not exclude the possibility of an unobserved variable to drive
the evolution of both homophily and polarization. Although the
presence of such an unobserved variable is highly unlikely within
the framework of our model and the variables used for empirical
analysis, we encourage future research to build upon the above
results to improve the causal nature of the effect of homophily on
polarization—this would require analyzing scenarios where
homophily can be argued to be exogenous so that we are better
ensured about effects not being driven by unobserved variables.
(Such causal relationship may be investigated for topics other
than climate change as well).
We also found that the effect of homophily on polarization is
negative, i.e., increase in homophily in communication leads to
decrease in polarization of beliefs in future. This is counter-
intuitive because we would expect an increase in polarization
when homophily increases. Increasing homophily leads to situa-
tions where people are exposed to a narrow set of beliefs (Ace-
moglu et al., 2011, 2010) that conforms to their existing beliefs.
When such homophily in communication happens in two large
sections of the society with differing beliefs, it enhances polar-
ization (Esteban and Ray, 1994).
Polarization of beliefs can be affected not only by homophily in
communication among people, but also by the credibility of
information that propagates on Twitter. In this study, we investi-
gated whether credibility of information source plays a role to
increase polarization. We studied the ‘credibility’ factor because
this has received less attention in the literature and is a very
intuitive factor. It is intuitive since information from a source
which is not credible is naturally least likely to affect or change the
belief of an individual. Credibility is a dimension of information
independent of the veracity of information. For example, let us
consider a certain information (either true or fake) that comes
from two different sources at the same time: one source is a Twitter
account of a person who is not very well known, and another is the
Twitter account of BBC News (as instance) which has a much
larger credibility in the society. In this case the news sent by BBC
News has a higher probability to inﬂuence the beliefs of people at a
large scale. More so, if the news happens to be (intentionally or
unintentionally) fake, it can possibly affect the beliefs of a certain
section of the society in a wrong direction (since the news is fake)
thereby increasing polarization in the society because a new section
of the society emerges with beliefs much different from what the
entire population believed previously.
We modeled these two determinants of polarization discussed
above, homophily in communication and credibility of informa-
tion, jointly in a belief updating model where agents in a net-
worked society receive true and fake information from their
neighbors. We modeled the credibility of each type of informa-
tion using the precision or certainty of the information. The
model predicts that marginal increase in homophily always leads
to increase in polarization expect for the only case when fake
information has no credibility. In the case when fake information
is not credible, the model predicts a negative effect of homophily
on polarization. (This description is illustrated in Fig. 2). Since we
observed a negative effect of homophily on polarization in the
empirical analysis of climate change discussions on the Twitter
platform, we conclude that tweets expressing anti-climate change
beliefs are largely not credible to the broader society.
Our results disentangle the presence of fake information on
social media from its potential negative effect on the society. The
spread of fake information (either as misinformation or disin-
formation), as has been prevalent during recent years in online
social media (Vosoughi et al., 2018; Del Vicario et al., 2016), has
the potential to pose harm to the society by polarizing the beliefs
of people (Vosoughi et al., 2018; Del Vicario et al., 2016; Bessi
et al., 2016); for instance, it can inﬂuence political election out-
comes (Shin et al., 2017). However, does it mean that fake
information always has a negative effect on the society? Based on
our results of this study, we can say that it is not always the case.
In the case of reality about climate change, although there are
many climate-skeptic messages, we showed that such messages
are largely not credible and hence polarization (a negative con-
sequence for society) does not increase when users on the plat-
form communicate among themselves. Hence, in general, we
believe that the presence of fake information (on various topics
including climate change) in social media and the web is not a
conclusive evidence of its negative effect on the society at large.
This also reafﬁrms the fact that the negative effects of echo
chambers in social networks, which are known to arise due to
high levels of homophily in communication, might be overstated
(Warner, 2010; Bail et al., 2018; Flaxman et al., 2016; Dubois and
Blank, 2018).
We now discuss some assumptions about agents in our model,
and how alternative assumptions about human behavior (in real
world) may also explain how increase in homophily can lead to
decrease in polarization in future. Agents in the model are
rational (Madsen et al., 2018) and purely rely on previously held
beliefs and beliefs expressed by neighbors in their immediate
social networks to arrive at new beliefs. Such assumption of
Bayesian updating of beliefs dictates that when homophily
increases (i.e., agents’ exposure to non-conforming beliefs
decreases, or in other words, cross-attitudinal interactions
decreases), the ability of misinformed agents to move closer to
truth decreases. Human behavior, in general, is highly hetero-
geneous and there may exist different ways in which people
update beliefs in real world. Let us consider a different situation
where the utility of agents depends not only on the belief of own
type but also on the (opposite) belief held by the other type. In
particular consider a situation where people update beliefs in the
following manner—when people are exposed to cross ideologies,
instead of gaining higher utility by incorporating and averaging it
with own ideologies, they gain higher utility by the fact that they
know something (what they think is supposed to be known) and
the opposite party is misguided and carries the wrong belief. In
such a case, if homophily increases, cross-attitudinal interactions
decrease and the misinformed agents are less convinced about
their belief because their exposure to informed type (opposite
type) agents decreases. This leads to dilution of ones’s held beliefs
and creates a decrease in polarization. Although such a behavioral
assumption can lead to an alternative way to explain negative
effect of homophily on polarization, we believe that such
assumption may not scale to a wider population. (Especially in
the case of reality about climate change, we believe that informed
people would also want ill-informed sections of the society to
know about the reality as they do). In this context, we believe that
by imposing a Bayesian updating criteria we have studied the
expected outcomes in a baseline model, and is (ideally) repre-
sentative of the behavior of a larger population. We consider the
model we analyzed in this study to be parsimonious enough to be
able to explain the negative effect of homophily on polarization
by highlighting the role of information credibility. Future
research, depending on the nature of investigation, may ﬁnd our
analysis as a useful guide.
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Individual rumors are being debunked in due time by fact
checking measures (Zhao et al., 2015; Ciampaglia et al., 2015),
however, public perception about some issues like human
induced (anthropogenic) climate change have remained con-
troversial for a long time (Tvinnereim et al., 2017). Such con-
troversy appears to persist even after several investigations made
by the scientiﬁc community. Various factors like exposure to
different kind of information on the media (Iyengar and Massey,
2019; Williams, 2016), politicization of climate change (McCright
and Dunlap, 2011), and exposure to fake information on social
media platforms are potential reasons that can contribute to
polarization of beliefs about the reality of climate change. In this
study, we showed that social media messages on platform like
Twitter is not a potential concern because although there are
many sources propagating fake beliefs regarding climate change,
the collective credibility of such sources is negligible. Future
research may contribute to improve our understanding about
how public perceives the reality about climate change. It is better
that the society is not polarized on beliefs about the reality of
climate change, so that timely environmental policies can be
implemented with least public resistance. Since credibility of
major fake information sources about climate change can polarize
beliefs on a large scale, it is important to assess credibility of such
sources and their potential negative effects on society. (In this
context, polarization is one such negative or undesired effect).
Data availability
All data used can be publicly accessed from Twitter’s Advanced
Search function. Another way would be to use Twitter’s API and
query the tweets by their IDs; for this we make available the list of
IDs of all tweets used for this study in the Dataverse repository:
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/LNNPVD. The code to reproduce
the results of the empirical analysis is also available in the above
repository.
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